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SYMPOSIUM
THE NATURAL LAW AND THE FAMILYf
THE NATURAL LAW, THE MARRIAGE BOND,
AND DIVORCE
BRENDAN F. BROWN*
I. THE NATURAL LAW DICTATES MONOGAMXY
N ATURAL law is that objective, eternal and immutable hierarchy of
moral values, which are sources of obligation with regard to man be-
cause they have been so ordained by the Creator of nature. This law con-
forms to the essence of human nature which He has created. It is that
aspect of the eternal law which directs the actions of men.' Although this
law is divine in the sense that it does not depend on human will, neverthe-
less, it is distinguishable from divine positive law, which has been com-
municated directly from God to men through revelation, for natural law
is discoverable by reason alone." Natural law has been promulgated in the
intellect. At least as regards its more fundamental principles it is know-
able proximately through the conscience. 3
The most basic ideal of this law, namely, that every man must live in
accordance wth his rational nature, so that he will do good and avoid
evil, is self-evident to all. No reasoning is required to reach a knowledge
of this ideal.4 But other parts of the natural law are not perceivable with
an equal degree of facility. Varying gradations and types of reasoning
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Albert Conway and Honorable Owen McGivern presided.
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1. Aquinas, St. Thomas, Sumnia Theologica, Treatise on Law, Q. 90-97 inc., Review
by Brown, I De Paul L. Rev. 312-318 (1952).
2. Ibid.
3. Sheedy, Letter, October 10,1954, to Brendan F. Brown.
4. Connell, Outlines of Moral Theology 30 (1953).
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are necessary to ascertain the sub-norms of that law. 5 Some of these are
discoverable by an immediately derived deduction, which is almost
obvious, such as the requirement of some form of marriage or contractual
agreement before a man and a woman can lawfully have sexual relations.
But other sub-norms are ascertainable only after observation, study, and
experience, both individual and sociological. Examples are the secondary
goal of marriage, and the precise means for the just and adequate effectu-
ation of the primary and secondary purposes of marriage.'
The necessity of some kind of marriage, either polygamous or monog-
amous, dissoluble or indissoluble, is obviously deducible from the basic
ideal of the natural law, since without propagation and the rearing of
children, the human race would become extinct.7 This ideal demands some
form of abiding union between man and woman, even if it be only for a
limited period. All men realize that there must be some fixed, definite and
settled arrangement, which will enable man and woman not only to pro-
create, but also to protect the offspring until they are capable of looking
after themselves. It is self-evident that marriage differs from the mating
of animals, to the extent that will and reason are distinguishable from
blind instinct.' No demonstration is needed to show that marriage must
uphold the unique dignity of human personality.
The study of cultural anthropology reveals the historical fact that
practically all peoples have attached an inherently sacred and religious
character to marriage, which they have expressed by special and symbolic
rites of a public and solemn kind. These rites became part of their tradi-
tions, customs and laws, which recognized that marriage is not of human,
5. Sheedy, Materials for Legal Ethics 10 (1950) edited notes of Right Reverend Monsignor
William J. Doheny, C.S.C., J.U.D., judge of the Roman Rota.
6. Joyce, Christian Marriage 6-8 (1948).
7. See Petrovits, The New Church Law on Matrimony (1921). On page 1, he writes:
"Marriage in General. The word matrimony is a compound derived from the two Latin
words, namely, nmatris mrunum meaning the office of the mother. The burdens Inherent In
gestation, the pain accompanying parturition, and the numerous anxieties subsequent to child
birth, being indicative of the most intimate relationship between mother and child, are gener-
ally adduced as the reason why the word mother in preference to the word father has been
embodied in the name of this Sacrament."
8. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage (Casti Connubfi), December 31,
1930, Translation published by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C.
(1931). This Encyclical elaborates and emphasizes certain points in the Encyclical Arcanum
of Pope Leo XIII, published fifty years previously, namely, on February 10, 1880. The chief
purpose of Casti Connubii was to reaffirm the basic thought of Arcanum In the light of
conditions which adversely affected the society of the family at the beginning of the thirties.
See also Pope Pius XII, Address to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives, October 29,
1951, Translation included in Moral Questions affecting Married Life, Discussion Outline by
Rev. Edgar Schmiedeler, O.S.B., Ph.D., Director, N.C.W.C. Family Life Bureau, National
Catholic Welfare Conference, 18 parag. 49.
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but of divine origin, in which man does not create life but only cooper-
ates with Divinity in its transmission.'
Man is obliged in his choice of institutions to select only those which
are in agreement with the natural law. This is particularly true of mar-
riage since it is one of the most important, affecting as it does, the spir-
itual and temporal welfare of the whole human race by determining the
status of the family which is the foundation of society. 10 According to
the natural law, there is an obligation to adopt that form of marriage
which will best achieve not only the almost self-evident objective of
satisfying the urge toward propagation, and care for the physical needs
of children, and their moral and educational training, but also the second-
ary purpose, namely, the mutual assistance of the spouses, physical,
mental and spiritual, and the allaying of concupiscence. 11
But the precise form of marriage which is commanded by the natural
law is not immediately apparent and known to all, for it does not pertain
directly to the primary inclination of that law. The prescribed type of
marriage is not a primarily derived deduction from the basic ideal of the
natural law, as are the prescriptions of the Decalogue, for example.
-12
This explains why there is more agreement that murder is against the
natural law than there is that divorce is morally wrong.
The characteristics of unity and indissolubility in regard to marriage
are secondary conclusions from the natural law, like the right of a worker
to a living wage. They are not readily obvious because they relate to the
secondary end of marriage, and to ways and means for best reaching
9. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 28;
Ayrinhac, Marriage Legislation in the New Code of Canon Law (revised and enlarged by
Rev. P. J. Lydon, D-D.) 234 (1952); and Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, A Text and
Commentary 453, 454 (2nd ed. 1953).
10. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 3, and
Pope Pius XII, Address to the National Congress of the "Family Front" and the Assodation
of Large Families, November 26, 1951, Translation included in Moral Questions affecting
Married Life, supra note 8 at 24, parag. 1.
11. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 21;
Canon 1013 parag. 1 of the Code of Canon Law.
12. It should be noted that there is another nomenclature to e-xpres-s the varying grada-
tions of the natural law. Thus sometimes the basic or most universal principle is called the
primary precept, while an immediate deduction is referred to as a secondary precept rather
than as a primary deduction. According to this nomenclature, a more remote conclusion
would be called a tertiary precept of the natural law rather than a secondary con-
clusion. See Connell, Outlines of Moral Theology 29, 30 (1953); Sheedy, The Chris-
tian Virtues 33-35 (1951), and Letter, October 10, 1954, to Brendan F. Brown. The
marriage bond is the formal cause of marriage; man and woman, the material cause; the
wills of the parties, the proximate efficient cause, the natural appetites, the remote efficient
cause; and the procreation and education of children and the natural aid of spouses are the
final cause. See Ryan, Philosophy of farriage and the Family, in Marriage and Family
Relationships (edited by Clemens) 42 at 49-54 (1950).
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the primary and secondary goals.' 3 Reasoning and study are required to
distinguish between perfect and imperfect means, and to recognize the
secondary objective of marriage, but not in regard to the abnegation of
means altogether. Lifelong monogamy is morally necessary for the attain-
ment of man's ethical life, and the aims and functions of marriage.' 4 This
becomes clearer when it is contrasted with the only other type of marital
relationship, namely, polygamy.
It is manifest that polyandry, i.e., that type of polygamy found in his-
tory in which one woman has two or more husbands at the same time, is
the worst possible matrimonial arrangement, for if it does not entirely
suppress the primary end of marriage, at best it places obstacles to its
realization. 1 Polyandry contravenes the most important purpose of mar-
riage, for it curtails generation, casts doubt on paternity, and interferes
with the proper upbringing of children. It is not necessary to have re-
course to the rational faculty of deduction and induction, to any consider-
able extent, to know that polyandry, like murder, may never be reconciled
with any part of the ,natural law under any circumstances.10
Neither polygyny, i.e. that form of polygamy, where one man has
more than one wife at the same time, nor successive polygamy, which re-
sults from the exercise of the right of remarriage after divorce, when the
former spouse, either husband or wife, is still alive, entirely suppresses or
prevents the attainment of the primary end. But neither perfectly
achieves the primary goal, and both are directly opposed to the second-
ary. '7 Both attain the secondary goal better than polyandry,' 8 and,
strictly speaking, may be reconciled with the essential demands of nature,
in those exceptional situations which are sanctioned by supernatural
law.'9 But only indestructible monogamy will adequately make possible
the complete fulfillment of all the duties which have been imposed on
13. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 36, 37;
Canon 1013, parag. 2.
14. 4 Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology 49 (1936): "Marriage is the lawful contract
between man and woman by which is given and accepted the exclusive and perpetual right
to those mutual bodily functions which are naturally apt to generate offspring." Ryan,
Philosophy of Marriage and the Family in Marriage and Family Relationships, op. cit. supra,
note 12 at 54: "The matrimonial bond is indissoluble because it is ordained to a function
which is not arbitrary or temporary, but durable and permanent." Vermeersch, A Catechism
arranged according to the Encyclical "Casti Connubii" of Pope Plus XI (trans. by
Bouscaren), under title What is Marriage 7 (1950) and following. See Canon 1110.
15. Individual Ethics and Social Ethics, a Digest of Lectures for Students of Fordham
University, 59, 60.
16. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 457.
17. Individual Ethics and Social Ethics, a Digest of Lectures for Students of Fordham
University, 60, 61.
18. Joyce, op. cit. supra note 6 at 18-21.
19. Id. at 26-31.
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husband and wife by the natural law. Hence, marriage under the natural
law may be defined as a lawful, exclusive, and lifelong contract between
a man and a woman, by which is mutually given and accepted a right to
those physical functions for the performance of acts which are mutually
apt for the generation of children, resulting in a status primarily intended
for the care and education of children, and secondarily for the mutual
help of the spouses and the allaying of concupiscence.
I. IT IS PARADOXICAL TO REJECT ONE KIND OF POLYGAMY
AND TO ADOPT ANOTHER
Today in this country, there is no problem of simultaneous polygamy.
The peoples of the Western World of Christendom have always rejected
the institution of simultaneous polygamy, both temporary and permanent,
whether it assumed the form of polyandry or polygyny. Indeed all civ-
ilized peoples have repudiated the practice of polyandry and only a few
have sanctioned polygyny. But it is paradoxical for those nations which
refuse to accept simultaneous polygamy to legalize successive polygamy,
in the way of easy divorce with the right of remarriage. The same reasons
which prompt the rejection of the former, even though it is for the life of
the spouses, are applicable to the latter.
Why do the American people reject the doctrine of simultaneous polyg-
amy? It is because they are aware that the natural law requirement of a
maximum contribution on the part of the parent is diluted, that unreason-
able and unnecessary opportunity is afforded for generative activity, so
that the physical aspect of marriage tends to obscure the rational, and
that even if a plural marriage was indissoluble, there never could be that
complete surrender and cooperation of the spouses which are required for
the adequate fulfillment of the primary and secondary purposes of mar-
riage."0 The total needs of the spouses are never fully satisfied."
But most of these reasons apply with equal vigor in essence to a system
of divorce, which results in successive polygamy. There is the same lack
of mutual aid and concentration of effort on the part of the parents
though on a different level with consequential harm to the children.22
There is a similar inability of the parents to fulfill the duties which they
have undertaken toward their offspring and themselves. There is an
analogous deficiency in the matter of conjugal faith, honor, and love,
accompanied by inherent jealousies and discords engendered by the al-
ways present possibility of divorce which is greatly increased if the right
20. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 456, 457. See The Christian Family,
Statement of the Bishops of the United States, 1949, published by the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C.
21. Joyce, op. cit. supra note 6 at 19, 20.
22. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at p. 4S7.
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of remarriage is available,23 for a person will not be inclined to continue
cohabitation in case of a somewhat unhappy marriage, if the choice is
between that marriage and a new marriage, rather than between that mar-
riage and no marriage. Indeed a permanent plural marriage might have
certain advantages over the present system of dissoluble monogamy for
at best it would insure the continuing united efforts of the natural parents
in favor of the child in a stable marital arrangement. The indissolubility
of marriage is at least as important as its unity.
By allowing divorce with remarriage, monogamy is destroyed in prin-
ciple, as well as in practice. Attempts to preserve the ideal of monogamy,
which has become part of the tradition of civilized man, become fictional
once an exception is made in favor of divorce for any reason on the nat-
ural level. An unbreakable marriage bond is an indispensable condition
for true monogamy which has for its purpose the subordination of man's
lower nature to the demands of his rational self.2 4 If an exception is
made, his rational nature will be constantly urged to find some justifica-
tion to bring the marriage in question within the exception, and if this is
not possible to induce the legislator to allow more and more exceptions.
One ground of divorce begets others under the powerful urge of two great
forces,2 5 namely, the example of others in indulging their inordinate de-
sire for pleasure and the satisfaction of sex, which perhaps creates the
greatest emotional drive next to self-survival itself.
All attempted justifications of divorce, as distinguished from separa-
tion, relate to the secondary object of marriage, never to the primary.
They exalt the quest of the spouses for happiness, or the avoiding of
hardship, at the expense of the welfare of the children. But according to
the natural law, the essence of true monogamy is derived from the social
interest in the stability of the family, which must always and necessarily
outweigh the social interest in the personal improvement, desires and
claims of husband and wife. Monogamy loses its true character and
significance unless the individual interest of the spouse is completely
subordinated to the primary end, the benefit of mankind. Actually the
perfection of the spouses in the family is impossible unless they pursue
the essential ends of marriage as recognized from the direction of the
marital act toward procreation and the resulting duties to children. Per-
fection can not come from acting contrary to one's nature and the
directives of the natural law.2"
23. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 9,14..
24. Id. at 36. See Lachance, Peace and the Family, 9 The Thomist 138-139 (1946)
cited by Ryan, Philosophy of Marriage and the Family, in Marriage and Family Relationships,
op. cit. supra note 12 at 52. See Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 5 at 11.
25. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 33.
26. Pope Pius XI, Address to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives, op. cit. supra
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That monogamy works personal hardships in particular cases is no
valid reason for rejecting it.17 Every beneficial law necessitates sacrifices
on the part of some individuals. Numerous examples may here be cited,
such as the laws providing for compulsory military service, the quaran-
tining of persons afflicted with highly contagious diseases, and the imposi-
tion of taxes. 8
True monogamy does not exclude the possibility of separation, in cer-
tain exceptional situations, but only the right of remarriage. This right
destroys monogamy and substitutes successive polygamy. Separation
does not impair the marriage bond, which is manifestly not physical, but
merely the fact of cohabitation. This is not identical with the bond, but
simply the natural and usual result of it. Although cohabitation is re-
quired for the attainment of the primary and secondary aims of marriage,
separation is allowable, indeed it may become imperative, if continued
cohabitation in a particular marriage should become a cause or occasion
of the frustration of these ends. -0 Separation will eliminate those evils
which advocates of divorce advance as justification for the breaking of
the marriage bond.30 It is certain that dissolution of this bond is not
necessary for the removal of such evils. Under the natural law, however,
the right of separation is only temporary, lasting only as long as the
conditions which originally justified it.31
note 8 at 18, parag. 47. See Ryan, op. cit. supra note 12 at 51, 52: "In appraising this
problem of the ends or purposes of marriage, it is necessaryi first of all, to distinguish between
an objective and a subjective purpose. An objective purpose is that to which something is
directed by the very nature or its form (finis operis). A subjective purpose is the personal
motive the intention of the agent (finis operantis). As far as subjective purposes in marriage
are concerned, they may be multiple, such as economic security, good name, friendship
between nations, sharing intellectual labors, love satisfaction, etc. In the matter of objective
purposes (and it is these with which we are concerned here), they must be judged by the
very nature of the marital act, not by some extrinsic motivation, however grand and noble
it may be."
See Id. at 42-54, for a scholastic critique of the "adjustment" theory of marriage
as advocated by Prof. Henry A. Bowman, Prof. Joseph Kirk Folsom, and Prof. Willard
Waller, of the "companionship" theory as favored by Dr. Ernest W. Burgess and Locke,
and of the "perfection" theory which endeavors to bridge the gap between the "com-
panionship" and "procreation-education" theories, as explained by A. L. Ostheimer.
27. Scott, Divorce is a Disease which destroys Marriage 10-12 (1942).
28. Id. at 14. The individual who assists in the creation of the society of the family by
marriage exists for the maintenance of the marriage bond, analogous to a citizen who oxists
for the stability of the State, or politically organized society, when it is threatened, for
example, by unjust war. But in each case, this is so because in sacrificing himself for the
marriage bond, or for the State, the individual preserves that which is required for his own
private good in ultimate analysis.
29. Canon 1128.
30. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 32.
31. Connell, Letter, November 22, 1954, to Brendan F. Brown.
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A large majority of the American people have accepted values concern-
ing the marriage bond, which do not conform to those of the natural law.
Their sincerity in holding these opinions, however, may be respected.
They may be invincibly ignorant in this respect, and hence morally blame-
less in seeking divorces and remarrying.82 This may be explained by the
fact that the obligation to accept the ideal of true monogamy and to con-
form to it in practice is a conclusion remotely derived from the natural
law, and not an obvious and proximate deduction therefrom. 8 But so
likewise is the obligation to refrain from simultaneous polygamy, which
has always been well perceived. The intricate task of explaining the his-
torical, psychological and ethical reasons for this paradox would indeed
be challenging.
The grave sociological evil of divorce may be observed in the growing
number of delinquent children in this country, who are the victims of
broken homes.34 Neither the school nor any other public agency can ade-
quately replace the parents in the formation of the character of the child.
When the parents fail in the performance of duties arising from the nat-
ural law, the child becomes the waif of society.
III. THERE IS A SUPERNATURAL LAW OF MARRIAGE
Of course, reason applied to the natural law has its limitations in mak-
ing known the complete will of the Author of nature to man in regard to
the permanence of the bond of marriage. Thus by the light of reason
alone, man could never have discerned that Christian marriage, i.e., the
marriage of two baptized persons, is a sacrament, that marriage was re-
stored by Christ to its original condition of divorceless monogamy, and
that all of its spiritual discipline was entrusted to His spouse, the
Church."5 Natural law could never lead man to the knowledge that God
has never granted and will not grant a dispensation for the breaking of
the bond, under any circumstances, where it has resulted from sacra-
mental marriage between two baptized persons after physical consumma-
tion.86 Natural law is silent as to whether its Author provided for a
dispensation by a supernatural law so as to dissolve the natural bond
32. Joyce, op. cit. supra note 6 at 6-8.
33. Ibid.
34. The Christian in Action, Statement of the Bishops of the United States, 1948, pub-
lished by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C,; Clemens, The Crisis
in Family Life, in Marriage and Family Relationships 1, 3 (1950); Gellhorn, assisted by
Hyman and Asch, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City 273 (1954): thus
more than 300,000 children under the age of 21 years were involved in the more than
400,000 divorces in 1948.
35. Joyce, op. cit. supra note 6 at 147-152; Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 1-4.
36. Canon 1118.
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in exceptional situations, both past and present, or even the sacramental
bond of a non-consummated marriage.
But once man by faith and grace comprehends the truth that God is
the Author of a supernatural, as well as a natural, law, he perceives that
there is nothing unreasonable and even impossible in God's making the
bond of natural marriage dissoluble, if supernatural objectives so neces-
sitate. It would be unreasonable for God to dispense, for example, from
the duty to refrain from blasphemy, because that duty springs from that
part of the natural law which directly relates to the final end of man's
moral life.ar But the unity and indissolubility of marriage do not have
a direct bearing on this end. They rather relate to morally necessary
means towards that end. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in the dis-
pensation from the means which God gave under the Mosaic law in the
Old Testament. It is significant, however, that while God dispensed
from the unity of natural law marriage by permitting polygyny at one
time, polyandry remained forbidden as contrary to the primary precepts
of the natural law. Nor is it unreasonable that God continues to grant
dispensations from the indissolubility of natural law marriage in the New
Testament under the Pauline Privilege and the Privilege of the Faith."
These two Privileges are supernatural means for the termination of the
natural marriage bond. Their rationale is that a person should not be
penalized by the natural law because of his or her conversion to Chris-
tianity. Sometimes the reason for the dissolution of the bond by the
Privilege of the Faith is the conversion of the baptized non-Catholic to
the Catholic faith. According to these Privileges, the natural bond of
marriage, between two unbaptized persons, or one baptized and the other
unbaptized, must yield under certain circumstances and allow for the in-
stitution of the bond of a new marriage, contracted on the supernatural
level, because the unbaptized spouse has received baptism and wishes to
marry a baptized person.39
According to Canon 1120 § 1 of the Code of Canon .Law40 of the Cath-
olic Church, "legitimate marriage between unbaptized persons, even if
consummated, is dissolved in favor of the Faith by virtue of the Pauline
Privilege." This Privilege was promulgated by St. Paul. It provides that
if one of two unbaptized parties to the marriage receives baptism, and the
other party departs physically or morally, as a result thereof, as deter-
mined by interpellations, i.e., an examination of the attitude of the un-
baptized spouse toward Christianity, the marriage is dissoluble. Canon
1121 § 1 states that the converted party must ask the unbaptized party
37. Connell, op. dt. supra note 4 at 30.
38. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 300-327.
39. Canon 1126.
40. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 607-611.
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whether he or she is also willing to be converted and to receive baptism,
or, at least, to cohabit peaceably without blaspheming the Creator.
These two questions must be asked "unless the Apostolic See directs
otherwise." 41 The Pauline Privilege applies if the second question is
answered negatively, and it may apply if the first question is answered
negatively. The negative answer may be express or implied.
The Privilege of the Faith results from "the ministerial power of the
Roman Pontiff to dissolve non-sacramental marriages under certain con-
ditions when the Pauline Privilege, in the proper sense, is not at all appli-
cable, etc." 42 Both parties to the marriage must have been unbaptized
for the application of the Pauline Privilege, but the Privilege of the Faith
may be applicable, even though one of the two parties is baptized. There
must be a departure of the unbaptized person for the granting of the
Pauline Privilege, but not for that of the Privilege of the Faith. Inter-
pellations are normally required in the former, but not in the latter.
Divorce is also possible if the marriage has not been consummated.
Thus Canon 1119 of the Code states, "Marriage non-consummated be-
tween two baptized parties, or between one baptized and one unbaptized,
is dissolved by the very fact of solemn religious profession, and also by
dispensation of the Holy See, granted for a just cause at the request of
the two parties or even of one of them, against the wish of the other."
IV. THE STATE HAS A LIMITED JURISDICTION OVER MARRIAGE
But while reason does not positively enable man to discover the super-
natural law in regard to the marriage bond, it will make known that mar-
riage is a social institution, so that civil authority, exercised by the State,
has some jurisdiction over the natural bond in the case of the unbap-
tized.43 The State is the only social authority available for the unbaptized.
41. Canon 1121 parag. 3.
42. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 325, 326. A sharp distinction may be drawn
between the Pauline Privilege, the extension of the same by the Papal Constitutions (Canon
1125), and the direct dissolution of the natural bond by the Holy See in javorem fidcl, which
really is a ratum et non-consummatum case, if the convert was unbaptized and had married
a baptized non-Catholic. Where the convert becomes baptized, there exists a ratified marriage
of two baptized persons, but not consummated after the second baptism. This marriage may
then be dissolved by the Holy See as raturn et non-consummatum; see Letter of May 11,
1954, to Brendan F. Brown from Rt. Rev. Msgr. Robert E. McCormick, former Officialls,
Archdio;ese of New York, Metropolitan Tribunal, citing Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law,
A Text and Commentary 603, 619, 620 (2nd ed. 1953).
43. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 529-530: The State may temporarily
restrain the exercise of the right of marriage when one is afflicted with a contagious disease,
provided it puts "itself in agreement with the competent authority, which, in the case of
baptized persons, is the Church." But the laws "enacted in several states requiring health
certification as a condition for the issuance of the marriage license" fail to "recognize this
limitation upon the power of the state."
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They are not under the authority of the Church. Hence, the competence
of the State may extend not only to the material aspects of their marriage,
such as property rights, but also into the field of morals and natural reli-
gion with certain limitations. 44 Natural law sets the minimum require-
ments of a juridical institution, authorizing Church and State to establish
additional reasonable requirements in the light of specific social conditions
of the time and place.
The State has the right and duty to create a juridical institution of
marriage for the unbaptized, and also for the baptized insofar as the
purely civil effects are concerned. 415 Manifestly the State has authority
over the strictly temporal effects of marriage. 40 These are separable from
the essence of marriage. Examples would be the determination of prop-
erty rights, such as dower or testamentary succession.
The State is competent to establish reasonable diriment impediments,
and to grant separation from bed and board, provided it follows the prin-
ciples of the natural law.4 But it has no power to dissolve the marriage
bond, which is never civil, but either natural or supernatural.48 Every
positive law which purports to confer authority to grant divorce, except
in cases coming within the operation of the supernatural law, is contrary
to the natural law, and therefore lacks the element of juridicity. This
does not mean, of course, that those who avail themselves of such laws
are subjectively culpable, if they act in ignorance and good faith.
According to the natural law, all marriages are either valid or invalid
from the beginning, on the objective plane, with no human discretion
44. Id. at 462-463: "All persons have the right to marry from the natural law, but not the
duty. This right precedes the State. But the State may reasonably regulate the esercise of
this right or even suspend it for a while for a private or a common good. The State may
establish reasonable impediments with regard to the marriages of citizens who are not bap-
tized, but not such as will in effect alienate the right itself. Of course the State has no
authority over the sacramental bond resulting from marriages between two baptized persons."
See Madden, Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations 3S, 39 (1931)
and Brown, Brendan F., The Canon and Civil Law of The Family, in Marriage and
Family Relationships (edited by Clemens) 57 at 64 (1950). Some of the American states
have created impediments which are not in accord with the natural law, such as the
miscegenation statutes prohibiting marriages between whites and negroes, or between whites
and Indians or Orientals. But observance of these laws is dictated by prudence grounded on
the natural law in the interest of the public peace since they violate the natural law by
limiting a person's right to marry, rather than by commanding "a person to do something
prohibited by the natural law." See Brown, Brendan F., Foreword xvi, in Del Vecchio,
Giorgio, Philosophy of Law (trans. by Martin) 1953.
45. Vermeersch, op. cit. supra note 14 at 12.
46. Canon 1016.
47. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 32;
Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 5 at 63 citing Canons 1016, 1038, 1960 and 1961.
48. Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 5 at 78.
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capable of declaring void what was once a valid marriage. 40 Natural law
does not admit of a voidable contract of marriage, as does the law of New
York, for example, which distinguishes between a voidable marriage, as
where one of the parties is under the age of eighteen, and a void marriage,
as where a brother and sister have endeavored to marry. In the first case,
the voidable marriage may be declared void, or annulled, at the suit of the
party under the proper age, in the discretion of the court. In the second
instance, the marriage is void and the court must declare it a nullity."°
The New York statutes have blurred the concept of annulment as under-
stood by the natural law, by referring to the annulment of a voidable
marriage which was originally valid, because annulment according to the
natural law declares that a marriage never existed. 1 The concept of
voidable marriage attaches, to an objectively valid marriage, a divesting
condition subsequent in the form of a discretion, on a subjective and
psychological level, and accordingly deviates from the standard of the
natural law which knows only conditions precedent completely invalidat-
ing a marriage.52
These conditions precedent relate to deficiencies in the matter of the
internal factors of will and reason, and the external element of form. The
State is under an obligation to construct a juridical institution of marriage,
applicable to the unbaptized, which will incorporate these conditions
precedent into its positive law. Only in this way will the correct line be
drawn between valid and void marriage, and consequently between the
relevance of divorce or annulment in a particular case.
The contract of marriage is created by an act of the mutual wills of the
parties, who actually intend to enter into marriage. 3 Only the parties
themselves can supply this act of will. Neither the will of the parent, nor
of the State, nor of the Church, may be substituted. 4
Voluntary assumption of reciprocal rights and duties, mutuality in
their exercise, and equality in giving over to each other and receiving in
49. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 31;
Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 352-354, 372.
50. See N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 7; N.Y. Civil Practice Act, §§ 1132-1133, 1136-
1139, 1141; and Rules of Civil Practice, § 275ff; N.Y. Domestic Relations Law, § 5.
51. See Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 34 at 270-271.
52. Voidability implies dissolubility. See Brown, op. cit. supra note 44 at 65; Sheedy,
op. cit. supra note 5 at 77.
53. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Christian Marriage, op. cit. supra note 8 at 5, See
Petrovits, op. cit. supa note 7 at 2: "Marriage as a Mere Natural Contract. Marriage may
be taken in a two-fold sense, viz., marriage in fleri and marriage in facto esse. The former Is
a contract in which a qualified man and woman mutually oblige themselves to an Indissoluble
union in which by mutual consent each becomes a partial co-principle in the procreation of
offspring. The indissoluble union, or the marriage bond thus arising, is called marriage its
facto esse.'
54. Canon 1081 parag. 1.
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return those rights which are proper to the state of marriage, for the per-
formance of acts suitable of themselves for the procreation of children,
are characteristics of the contract." The nature of the contract is sui
generis, however, and may not be exactly fitted into the category of com-
mon law contract, based on consideration, or that of civil law contract,
founded on causa.5 Its uniqueness as a contract is further apparent from
the fact that consent may not alter the nature of the contract, nor the
essential laws that govern it, nor the resulting status from which arise
duties imposed by law.57
The consent of each party must be sufficient for the creation of the
contract of marriage. In the first place, the sufficiency of consent may be
destroyed by factors which directly militate against such consent. These
may be produced either by the act of the party or parties in question, for
example, by a simulated consent, or by attaching one or more invalidating
conditions to the matrimonial consent, or by the tort or crime of some one
else, who induces consent by force or fear.
The consent must not be simulated. This occurs when no consent
existed in the mind but a sufficient consent has been manifested. 8 The
55. Canon 1111. See Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 190-192 citing Canon 1031
parag. 2.
56. Madden, op. cit. supra, note 44 at 5-7.
57. Petrovits, op. cit. supra note 7 at 2-4: "The leading modem theologians, as well as
those of the past, are practically unanimous in teaching that marriage is a real bilateral con-
tract imposing an obligation on the contracting parties by virtue of commutative justice.
This needs no proof. It is obvious that the parties concerned form the material object of the
contract, while its formal object is the particular mode of life arising therefrom. In this mode
of life the contracting parties mutually oblige themselves not only to render those things and
to perform those duties which are essential to the very nature of such special contract, but
also to abstain from everything incompatible with its nature... Other contracts may be
valid by virtue of unilateral obligation, arising on the part of only one of the contracting
parties. The distinctive characteristic of the matrimonial contract is that it binds either both
parties or neither of them . . . Finally, the duration and firmness of the matrimonial con-
tract do not depend upon the contracting parties, for, even in the case of only a ratified
marriage, the contract is not rescindable at their will .. . Since marriage is a real bilateral
contract, in order that it may be valid, it must possess all the essential characteristics requi-
site for a binding contract, viz. it must be entered into with true, free, mutual, simultaneous
and externally expressed consent by two qualified individuals. This qualification presupposes
a physical aptitude for the act of procreation, freedom from all impediments . . . "(Note--i.e.
of the natural law in our particular treatment). "The essence of marriage in fier consists in
the manifestation of mutual consent to the matrimonial bond. This implies an exclusive and
perpetual right which each of the contracting parties acquires over the body of the other for
the purpose of procreation and education of children. The essence of marriage in facto mesC
consists in the conjugal union (igamen). The actual consummation of marriage, and com-
munity of shelter, of table and bed, pertain only to the integrity of the matrimonial contract,
not to its essence."
58. Canon 1051 parag. 2. See Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 201-204; Canon 1036,
parag. 2.
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consent must not depend on a condition which is "inconsistent with the
essential object of the marriage contract or destructive of one of its essen-
tial properties, as unity or indissolubility." 9 If all right to the proper con-
jugal act were excluded, for example, by either or both of the parties,
their act of will would not constitute a marriage."0 The same would be
true if a primary attribute of marriage, such as the right to the conception
of children, were denied and excluded. But exclusion of one or more of
the essential attributes of marriage, such as unity or indissolubility, would
not invalidate the marriage unless this were done by a positive act of the
will so that this exclusion would become the primary object of the will
rather than the intention to marry.61
Besides, the consent must not have been caused by unjust force or fear,
whether it be that which prevents all freedom by physical compulsion, or
that which only diminishes freedom of choice by moral coercion without
entirely destroying such freedom. 62 It is plain that the former kind of
force and fear is invalidating, but reasonable men may differ as to the
precise amount of the latter type, namely moral, which is required by the
natural law in a particular case to invalidate a marriage.03 They would
agree, however, that the force and fear must be caused unjustly by an ex-
ternal human agent, so that such grave fear results as to compel the
victim to choose marriage in order to avoid the evil which is presently
threatening and imminent. 4 It must be so overpowering as to justify the
resultant fear on the part of a reasonable person.05 Such is the determina-
tion of the Catholic Church regarding the marriages of the baptized.
Secondly, the matrimonial consent may be rendered insufficient by
causes which only indirectly affect the will by directly preventing the in-
tellect from adequately presenting the true facts of the situation to the
will. These causes may be either physical, as insanity and/or lack of
adequate consciousness, or intellectual, such as substantial error and
ignorance in regard to the obligations of the marriage contract.
Marriage would be possible, though not prudent, if the insane person
actually had lucid intervals, during one of which marriage was con-
tracted.6" But obviously adequate matrimonial consent would be impos-
sible if all reasoning capacity was permanently absent, as in certain types
59. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 226.
60. Canon 1086 parag. 2.
61. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 199, 203.
62. Id. at 205.
63. Id. at 205, 206. See 5 Cappello, 5 De Sacramentis, De Matrimonio, Articulus V, Do v
et metu, pp. 586-597 (1949).
64. Canon 1087, paragraphs I and 2.
65. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 207.
66. Id. at 192, 193.
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of mental disease, and in cases where alcohol, or a narcotic, or illness has
temporarily but substantially impaired reason or limited consciousness.
Again there would be no marriage if either or both of the parties did
not know that marriage was a permanent union of man and woman for
the purpose of begetting offspring. 7 But if the simple error related only
to the essential properties of marriage, the bond would be created. This
is so even where such error is the cause of the contract, 8 as long as the
primary intention is to contract marriage in the accepted sense of the
word.
Error as to the person renders a marriage invalid, as where A, intending
to marry B, marries C instead.69 But mistake concerning the quality of
the person would not invalidate a marriage except where such error
"amounts to an error about the person." 70 If A married B under the
mistake that B was rich, the marriage would be valid, even though B were
poor. Here it is assumed, however, that A has not actually made the
condition of wealth a condition sine qua non for his matrimonial consent,
for that would render the marriage conditional. 7 '
The reason element in the natural law institution of marriage is given
effect by recognizing that there are certain obstacles or impediments, in
the way of lack of fitness, which will prevent certain persons from enter-
ing upon valid marriage. All the impediments of the natural law are in-
validating, since the attribute of legality, associated with the positive law,
is irrelevant. Some of these obstacles arise from physical deficiency, as
impotence and lack of understanding, others from potential moral guilt,
as the bond of a previous marriage.
It is not required by the natural law that, at the time of the marriage,
each party must be able to perform the physical act required for consum-
mation. If it can be anticipated that in the future this will be possible, as
is normally the case, the natural law does not invalidate the marriage.
Invalidating impotence must be perpetual.7- But mere sterility, or lack
of fertility, does not invalidate a marriage."
According to the natural law, no particular age is required if both par-
ties have sufficient discretion.74 The impediment of defect of age, relating
to bodily incapacity, would arise, however, if either was so young as not
to be aware at least in a general way of the nature of marriage, and thus
67. Canon 1082 parag. 1.
68. Canon 1084. See Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 559, 560.
69. Canon 1033 parag. 1.
70. Canon 1083 parag. 2, § 1.
71. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 558.
72. Canon 1058 parag. 1.
73. Canon 1068 parag. S.
74. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 522.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
incapable of the matrimonial consent. Most generally, the mere age of
reason before puberty does not afford adequate knowledge.
Marriages .between persons related in the first degree of the direct line
and probably in all other degrees of that line, and probably also in the
first degree of the collateral line, are invalid according to the secondary
principles of the natural law.75 Such marriages are not mala in se (evil in
themselves), however, and may be justified under highly speculative and
improbable conditions of a hypothetical character. But they would cer-
tainly be mala per accidens (evil by circumstances) with reference to the
natural law in the present condition of mankind. Such marriages would
not be conducive to the physical and mental welfare of the children, who
would suffer from such excessive in-breeding. These marriages would be
highly detrimental, moreover, to the good of society, which benefits from
the extension of affection and friendship through marriages between mem-
bers of families not closely related by blood. 77
A previous and existing marriage would be an impediment, which re-
sults from the inherent unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond.71
Hence it would be clearly unreasonable to permit a person who is already
bound by the bond of a prior marriage to remarry while the former
spouse was alive.79 To authorize such a marriage would be to sanction
the crime of adultery, which the impediment seeks to avert.s°
In addition to the internal factors of will and reason, there is the ex-
trinsic element of actuality or form.8 ' The natural law does not prescribe
any particular form for the manifestation of the matrimonial consent,
authorizing the State to select any reasonable form for the marriage of
the unbaptized, while the Church lays down such condition for the bap-
tized.8 2 Of course, the consent must be known to both parties.88 The
form must be such that it will enable persons "whose means of perception
are confined to the five senses, acting upon physical matter," 84 to appre-
hend the expression of the marital consent. Natural law does not exclude
75. Ayrinbac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 170, 171, Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra noto 9
at 543.
76. Brown, The Canon Law of Marriage, 26 Virginia L. Rev. 70 at 82 (1939).
77. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 171.
78. Canon 1069 parag. 1.
79. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 530-532.
80. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 131-136.
81. See Brown, The Indissolubility of Marriage, since 1914, According to the Canon Law
of the Roman Catholic Church, Manuscript to be published; presented before the Round
Table on Canon Law of the Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law, University
of Paris, August 6, 1954.
82. Brown, op. cit. supra note 76 at 83-85.
83. Id. at 83, 84.
84. Id. at 84.
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vicarious expression through a proxy or interpreter, nor the form of an
exchange of letters in absentiz for serious reasons. Witnesses are not
absolutely demanded.8"
V. THE LEGAL ORDER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION HAVE A
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY
How has the law of the land met its obligation to formulate and main-
tain a juridical institution of marriage and divorce which gives effect to
the norms of the natural law? This law has more and more encouraged
divorce, and thus increasingly contributed to the disruption of the stabil-
ity of the home. 6 This is manifest from the growing policy of multiplying
the number of grounds for divorce in certain jurisdictions.8 7 It is appar-
ent from the trend toward the reduction of residential requirements for
the acquisition by the plaintiff of domicile, 8 which is the basis of judicial
jurisdiction, toward the removal of restrictions from the remarriage of the
parties, 9 and toward the detachment of the factor of the moral guilt or
fault of the parties to the marriage from the law of divorce. 0 Further
evidence may be found in the tendency toward the exemption of the
guilty spouse from legal penalty.91 At the same time, the Anglo-American
law has remained faithful, generally speaking, to the model of the natural
law in regard to the requirements for the inception of marriage. It has
made great advances in the direction of insuring a permanent family life
by the recognition of many new material domestic interests, and by pro-
viding remedies for their protection. 2 This is the second great paradox in
American life with reference to the law of domestic relations. 3
85. Carberry, The Juridical Form of Marriage 155 (1934).
86. Brown, The Canon and Civil Law of the Family, in Marriage and Family Relation-
ships (edited by Clemens) 57 at 69, 70 (1950).
S7. Brown, Brendan F., Divorce in Civil Jurisprudence from 1906, 18 The Catholic
Encyclopedia, Fourth Section, Supp. II, (1951). The grounds of divorce have so increased
that there are more than forty separate grounds now existing in the United States. See
National Conference on Family Life, 'Working Papers," American Families: The Factual
Background, VI Legal Status of the Family, 17, 18, held in Washington, D.C., May 5-8, 1948.
88. Brown, op. cit. supra note 87.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid. See Brown, op. cit. supra note 86 at p. 72.
91. Thus see the Report of the American Bar Association to the National Conference on
Family Life, Washington, D.C., Mlay 1948, recommending that "The new premise of preven-
tion should be substituted for the present premise of punishment," in regard to divorce
proceedings. See National Conference on Family Life, "Working Papers," Action Area:
Legal Problems 3; 73 Am. Bar Ass'n. Rep. 103-104,302-306 (1943).
92. See LeBuffe and Hayes, The American Philosophy of Law 351 et seq. (1953).
93. Brown, Judge and Lawyer and the Stability of the Home, 8 Detroit L. J. 141, 151
(1945). See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws paragraphs 158, 161, 162, 225 (1935);
4 Vernier, Id. parag. 234 (1936); National Conference on Family Life, "Working Papers,"
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There is no doubt that divorce has become a most serious sociological
problem in the United States.94 Statistics disclose the appalling growth of
divorce. The divorce curve has risen sharply since the first estimate was
made in 1906. At the end of the forty year period from 1906 to 1946,
divorces were increasing about fifteen times as rapidly as the population,
although in the first decade, 1906 to 1916, they increased only about three
times as fast. The divorce rate for 100,000 population rose from 84 in
1906 to 431 in 1946. The highest ratio of divorces to marriages was
reached in 1945, with one divorce for about every 31/3 marriages. The
number of divorces was equal to 26% of the marriages in 1946 compared
with 30% in 1945, 24% in 1947, 22% in 1948, 25% in 1949, 23% in
1950, 24% in 1951, and 25% in 1952, the latest figures on a national
scale available from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics, Washington,
D.C. 5 The 1953 Annual Summary of the Monthly Vital Statistics Re-
port, Part I, issued by this Office, containing divorce figures for twenty-
one states for 1953, shows that the combined total for these states is
quite close to their combined total for 1952. The United States still holds
the world's record in the matter of divorce, unsurpassed even by pagan
Japan and atheistic Russia.96
Members of the legal profession have a special responsibility to assist
in the maintenance of the stability of family life. The juridical order
through which civil authority functions for the granting of divorce is in
their hands. They occupy a more strategic position than those in the
other sociological professions, who can do no more than advise and recom-
mend. It is the legislator who selects those values of the family which will
receive the support of politically organized society. That support is delin-
eated with precision in relation to specific facts by the judge in the course
of adjudication. The practicing lawyer, who handles divorce cases, plays
an important role in bringing the issue of whether or not the State should
American Families, The Factual Background, VI, Legal Status of the Family 14 et seq.
(1948).
94. Secularism, Statement of the Bishops of the United States, 1947, published by the
National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C.
95. Final estimates for 1952 are 392,000 divorces and a rate of' 2.5 'divorces per 1000
population. Final figures on marriages for 1952 are a total of 1,539,318 and a rate of 9.9 per
1000 population. See Letter of November 12, 1954 to Brendan F. Brown from Hugh Carter,
Marriage and Divorce Analysis for Halbert L. Dunn, M.D., Chief, National Office of Vital
Statistics, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, Washington,
25, D.C.; also Brown, Brendan F., Divorce in Civil Jurisprudence from 1906, 18 The Catholic
Encyclopedia, Fourth Section, Supp. II, (1951) ; and LeBuffe and Hayes, op. cit. supra note
92 at 346, citing statistics given by Walsh, in Marriage and Civil Law, 23 St. John's L. Rev.
209, 225, 226 (1949).
96. Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 5 at 70; Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 372.
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declare that a particular marital bond ought to be terminated, within the
sphere of the judicial process.
It is rather well known, however, that a higher standard of duty is
imposed upon lawyers than upon judges, relative to their respective co-
operations in dissolving the marriage bond." This higher standard stems
from the fact that "unlike judges, lawyers are free to choose what busi-
ness they will accept and what business they will reject." ' The judge is
a public officer and does not have the same liberty as the lawyer who is
engaged in private practice. By the very nature of his office, a judge
is obliged to decide cases in accordance with the existing positive law,
despite his personal views. The harm resulting from his cooperation is
far outweighed when balanced against the irreparable damage to the pub-
lic good which would follow from the resignations of all conscientious
judges on the ground that they could not in conscience apply the law of
divorce. 9 In the hearing of divorce cases, however, the natural law makes
it incumbent upon the judge to act so that it will be certain that he does
not personally favor the granting of the divorce, or the implicit right of
remarriage.100
The lawyer stands in the place of his client so that if the client has the
moral right to seek a divorce, the lawyer is entitled in conscience to be his
attorney.10 1 But if the client seeks an unworthy divorce, then the attor-
ney proximately cooperates in disobeying a command of the natural law,
and becomes partly responsible for all the evil consequences, such as the
occasion of adultery, the public flouting of the ideal of indissolubility,
scandal, and the undermining of society.' Since these consequences are
public, as well as private, sole justification may not be sought in the fee
earned, as such, for this is only a private reason.'0 3 Theoretical justifica-
tion may be found in the fee if it were absolutely necessary to avert great
economic need, or to maintain the lawyer in his profession. 1 4 But this is
seldom, if ever, the situation, 05 so that actually there remains only a
justification derived from the protection of a public, social, or supernatural
interest.'0 6
Divorce may be discouraged by a number of means, as by making it
more difficult to obtain than at the present time. It may be curbed by the
97. Sheedy, The Christian Virtues 153, 154 (1951).
98. Sheedy, Mimeographed Material for Practicing Lawyers (1953).
99. Ayrinhac, op. dt. supra note 9 at 372, 373; Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 97 at 154.
100. Sheedy, op. dt. supra note S at 82.
101. Id. at 67.
102. Ayrinhac, op. cit. supra note 9 at 373, 374.
103. Ibid.
104. Id. at 374.
105. Bouscaren and Ellis, op. cit. supra note 9 at 629.
106. Sheedy, op. cit. supra note 5 at 67, 68.
